
--E. B. White
As we arise from the muddy ditch that was 2011, may the skies that lie ahead in 2012 shine brightly about us. May we find ourselves headed in the right direction, whatever that right direction might be and wherever it may lead us.
A guy from Seattle tries to tell the rest of the country how to shape up and do things right
If Kennan's] concern for the costs of bellicose foreign policy, rather than [Reagan's] enthusiasm for imperial exercise of American power, had dominated the last decade, it would have made for a sounder grand strategy.Amen.
are costlier than cats, but superior in every respect.
Readers of the British magazine are, by nature, civilized and reserved. But eyebrows were raised in subsequent letters to the editor.
The Economist has long been a favorite magazine. The statement quoted above, however, made casually and neither ironically nor as the writer's quirky personal opinion but rather as the recitation of a well-established fact, is so startlingly bizarre and patently false that the journal's accuracy with respect to other matters -- as well as the good judgment of its editors -- is called into serious question.
I feel as though I had long relied upon the opinions of a distinguished Harvard professor, until -- one day -- his mask slipped, and behind the mask I discovered Rick Perry.
I'm not canceling my subscription, but will certainly read the Economist with a more skeptical eye in the future.
"We, of course, never remove from the table any option in a situation like this, but we are very focused on diplomacy," said White House spokesman Jay Carney.
Instead, we should have made it clear that we would have no part in any unilateral attack on Iran or any other country. Such a statement would not preclude participation in additional international sanctions, if necessary.
We are correct in fearing proliferation of nuclear weapons. But Iran is also correct in sensing a certain arrogance on America's part, the United States possessing an enormous nuclear arsenal of its own. And Israel? Israel maintains an official stance of ambiguity as to whether it possess nuclear weapons ("nuclear opacity," they call it), but, along with India, Pakistan and North Korea, is generally believed to have developed nuclear weapons capability. (Israel, unlike Iran, has never signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.) Iran may sense a certain hypocrisy in our willingness to accept nuclear armament by nations perceived as friendly, while attacking less friendly nations for taking even preparatory steps in that direction.
Aside from the legalities of both nuclear proliferation by Iran and of a pre-emptive attack on a sovereign nation by Israel, exactly what is it about Iran's achievement of a nuclear capacity that we feel might justify such an attack? Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad tend to speak in tones of inflated inflammatory hyperbole, which is unfortunate for the success of Iran's foreign relations. But Iran's actual foreign policy has been cautious.
In 1980, lest we forget, Iran was deliberately and viciously attacked by Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces, hoping to defeat Iran during a moment of weakness following the 1978 Revolution. The war lasted for eight years, with a devastating loss of Iranian life. Monuments to the men and boys who died in that war can be seen everywhere in Iran today. Iran suffered an estimated one million casualties, with many survivors still suffering from Iraq's use of chemical warfare.
Iranians remember well the horrors of war. They are not apt to leap willingly into a new one. Their rhetoric may sound wild, but they are not stupid: they know that a nuclear attack on Israel would bring swift retribution from many sources.
More likely, they would use their nuclear capability to increase their own credibility in foreign affairs. After the Kuwait war with Iraq, when the United States essentially eliminated Iraq's defensive capability in one day, a spokesman for another Arab country -- I don't recall which -- commented that no country would ever challenge the United States again militarily, unless it had nuclear weapons. Iranians may have been listening -- concerned less about their ability to defy America militarily than in their own ability to be taken seriously as a major player in the Middle East.
We would find a nuclear armed Iran to be an inconvenience in our relations with Middle Eastern countries. But the prospect of future inconvenience doesn't justify an attack. We dealt with similar "inconveniences" in our relations with the Soviet Union; we face similar inconveniences today in dealing with Russia and China. We can handle the diplomatic challenges.
If we look over the history of American relations in the Middle East, one lesson we should learn is that nothing is constant. A friend today is an enemy tomorrow, and vice versa. We covertly supported Saddam Hussein's war against Iran, because of the hostility of the Iranian clergy after their Revolution. Ten years later, we were attacking Iraq.
If the friendship of any nation in the Middle East today would be valuable to the United States, it would be that of Iran. The Iranian people are sophisticated, with a strong sense of pride in their nation and in its lengthy history of civilization. The country, despite years of international sanctions, is modern with a good infrastructure. Iran still has a large middle class with close ties to America and to the West in general. Today, we may feel that Iran's political leaders are impossible to deal with. These feelings can change quickly with time.
But time would not fade the memory of an armed attack so quickly. Ask any Iranian, conservative or liberal, devout or secular, and he or she will tell you that an armed attack on Iran would be a disaster for both Iran and the West. Such an attack would unite all factions against the attackers. It would unite the country behind its present rulers. It would not be forgotten, not for generations.
Let's not go there.
I was struck, as I worked through my father-in-law's books, how quickly I became alienated from their rather stupid materiality. I began to resent his avariciousness, which resembled, in death, any other kind of avariciousness for objects.
So he spent his life buying books, Wood thinks. So what?
After all, can I really contend that my collection of books, ranged on shelves like some bogus declaration of achievement ..., tells my children anything more about me than my much smaller collection of postcards and photographs?
I feel somewhat devastated, reading these lines. Are my books simply a fraudulent assertion of my erudition? I walk about my house, gently carressing the covers of a few favorite, carefully-bound volumes.
I long ago promised a fellow book lover (Pat) that I'd leave him all of my books, should I move on to that Great Library in the Sky ahead of him. In fact I actually have that bequest written into my will. It was all in good fun for a long time, but lately, whenever the subject of my books arises, Pat nervously discusses the small amount of space available in his own home. My mind leaps forward, to those dread days following my hypothetical funeral; I see Pat wandering about my house, wringing his hands, wondering whatever he'll do with this unwelcome bounty. His wife would never allow him to haul them all into their home, even if there were room for them. Must he pay to put them into storage? He'll find no library or bookstore interested in them. Wood convinces me of that. But dare he -- a lover of books himself -- consign my gorgeous collection to the dump? I have bequeathed him a conundrum and a curse.
I pull myself together. Pat will just have to work it out on his own.
Wood is a good writer, and he managed to depress me, momentarily, with his certainties. And yet, I have certainties, too. My book collection, accumulated year by year since childhood, is an intellectual resource, a proven provider of amusement, and an anchor that gives my life -- with its ever-changing phases and interests -- a sense of continuity.
I have friends whose society is delightful to me; they are persons of all countries and of all ages; distinguished in war, in council, and in letters; easy to live with, always at my command.
~-Petrarch
Books are my friends, and, as with human friends, I'm not tossing them out simply because I don't know how they'll some day get along without me.
Without falsifying the distinct American sensibility that singled out Twain, then and now, as the quintessential American author, he stepped from -- or alongside -- his culture into a larger and different context. The Mark Twain who, by upbringing was Tom Sawyer and a Connecticut Yankee, became the mature Mark Twain who could inhabit both Huck, the orphaned redneck, and Jim, the runaway slave.
Mark Twain's mental growth, observable throughout his five months of newspaper essays, is emblematic of America's own similar growth and increased maturity in the nearly century and a half since Innocents Abroad was published.
It also suggests an excellent reason to encourage travel abroad by all Americans.
A year after his return, Twain concluded the book with a retrospective newspaper account of the trip, expressing sentiments with which all travelers can sympathize:
Nearly one year has flown since this notable pilgrimage was ended, and as I sit here at home in San Francisco thinking, I am moved to confess that day by day the mass of my memories of the excursion have grown more and more pleasant as the disagreeable incidents of travel which encumbered them flitted one by one out of my mind -- and now, if the Quaker City were weighing her anchor to sail away on the same cruise again, nothing could gratify me more than to be a passenger.
Mark Twain is always a good travel companion, and never better than when sharing his own thoughts and feelings while he himself is traveling.
-------------------------To view 40 photographs of the trek that I've posted on Facebook, click here.
What it is important to realize is that from the first the revolution was a revolution of the people. From the first moment neither the Duma nor the intelligentsia had any control of the situation. Secondly, the revolution was a revolution for land, bread and peace -- but, above all, for peace. There was only one way to save Russia from going Bolshevik. That was to allow her to make peace. It was because he would not make peace that Kerensky went under. It was solely because he promised to stop the war that Lenin came to the top.
Alexander Kerensky, the Social-Revolutionary leader after the March revolution, was, for the first four months, "worshipped as a god." But he and his government made the fatal mistake of trying "to drive back to the trenches a nation that had already finished with the war."
The sole concern of the British Foreign Office throughout this period, with respect to Russia, was to keep Russia from making peace. Britain was fighting a war of attrition on the Western Front. She was desperate to keep Germany distracted by a threat on its Eastern Front. But Kerensky eventually lost the confidence of the people by his support of the war, and Lenin struck at the opportunity. ("History will not forgive us if we do not assume power!") Promising to end Russia's involvement in the war, the Bolsheviks seized control in November 1917 (by our calendar).
The British at the time did not oppose the Bolsheviks because they were Communists -- they didn't take Lenin and his party seriously, believing they were a rabble that would fall within months. (Many in the Foreign Office -- showing their total ignorance of the political situation in Russia -- suspected the Bolsheviks of being German agents.) Britain's sole concern with the revolution, again, Lockhart emphasizes, was that it not prejudice Russian status as an allied belligerent.
After the Soviets signed a separate peace with the Germans (Brest-Litovsk, Feb. 1918), Lockhart remained a lonely voice in Moscow, urgently trying to build ties between the Western allies and the new Soviet rulers. He argued that Britain had nothing to lose in maintaining correct relations with the newly neutral government, especially since its leaders showed some interest in leaning as neutrals toward the West and away from Germany. The Allies, however, since before the revolution, had troops stationed in Archangel and Murmansk to protect allied shipping, troops that they now used to occupy and control those critical Arctic ports. The Foreign Office insisted that Lockhart pressure the Soviets into permitting intervention of allied forces against the Germans, passing from those ports through Soviet territory to the German front.
While Lockhart attempted to deal with Trotsky (at that point, his primary Soviet contact), the Allies were secretly planning to intervene in Russia, with or without Soviet permission. Lockhart's reasonably friendly personal relations with the Soviet leaders faded as suspicions grew as to Allied intentions and, therefore, as to his own integrity. The planned Allied intervention was wholly unsuccessful, the number of forces committed to the action being ludicrously small. In the summer of 1918, the assassination of Lenin was attempted, almost costing him his life. Lockhart and other foreign nationals were arrested, and "the Terror" against suspected opponents of the government was underway, a campaign conducted in direct retribution for the shooting.
The unfolding in Russia of these threatening and historic developments, described against the background of Lockhart's personal life and his rapidly deteriorating relations with his own Foreign Office, makes gripping reading. His observations of many of the well known Russian and Bolshevik leaders1 -- such as this description of the contrasting personalities of Lenin and Trotsky -- are perceptive:
Trotsky was all temperament -- an individualist and an artist, on whose vanity even I could play with some success. Lenin was impersonal and almost inhuman. His vanity was proof against all flattery. The only appeal that one could make to him was to his sense of humour, which, if sardonic, was highly developed. ... Trotsky was a great organizer and a man of immense physical courage. But morally, he was as incapable of standing against Lenin as a flea would be against an elephant.
When Lockhart returned to Britain at the age of 31, after being released from Soviet detention, he had virtually no allies left in the Foreign Office. Playing Cassandra is no way to make friends among your superiors, especially when your views and advice have been proved correct in virtually all respects and your powerful superiors' obstinancy and blunders have resulted in disastrous consequences for your nation.
Lockhart performed occasional services for the British government during his remaining years -- but his career in the foreign service was ruined and finished. He had been sentenced, in absentia, to death in Russia. He could never return to the country he loved, in which he had spent the most exciting and productive years of his life, and in which he had left behind many friends. He died in 1970 at the age of 83.
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He was a kind, old gentleman, who was susceptible to flattery and swallowed any amount of it. His knowledge of anything beyond banking and poker was severely limited. He had a traveling spittoon -- a contraption with a pedal -- which he took with him everywhere. When he wished to emphasize a point, bang would go the pedal, followed by a well-aimed expectoration.