I don't pretend to understand the mind of Vladimir Putin. I've read conflicting analyses; I'm not at all sure what his motives are.
I understand that the Crimea has historically (since 1783) been part of Russia, and I can appreciate the desire of Russians in Russia, as well as ethnic Russians in Ukraine, to see its return. But why now? And why is Putin so willing to sacrifice the good will Russia developed at such great expense in Sochi, as well as its economic ties with the rest of the world, in order to obtain an objective that gives Russia so little in return?
And why does Putin act so pugnacious and offensive in doing so? Has he never heard that it's easier to attact bees with honey than with vinegar?
Senator McCain was insulting and inaccurate when he declared this week that Russia is a gas station masquerading as a nation. Russia, whatever its political leadership, represents a great civilization. But the insult contains a kernal of truth -- Russia's solvency, at present, is essentially that of a third-world nation. Russia sells its natural resources. It designs or manufactures little that the rest of the world wishes to buy.
In today's world, national greatness rests on a nation's economic strength. And aside from "national greatness," whatever that means, a nation's natural primary objective should be the health and prosperity of its own people. I've never visited Russia. Admittedly, I might be pleasantly surprised by the health and prosperity of the Russians I would meet. But, based on reliable statistics that I read, I suspect not.
Rationally, therefore, President Putin should be focusing his attention on building Russia's economy, perhaps looking to China as an inspiring example of how a once impoverished nation can swiftly improve the welfare of its people. He is not.
Vladimir Putin reminds me of "great men" of past centuries -- Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Napoleon, Bismarck, and -- yes -- Hitler and Mussolini. Men who had little interest in the welfare of the masses of their subjects, but much interest in the "glory" of their nation. They saw themselves not as great law-givers, or business leaders, but as players at a great international game of chess. Whether by warfare or by diplomacy, these leaders sought always to enhance their nation's power -- regardless of whether those enhancements of power paid off in any real benefit to the great majority of the taxpayers who paid for it.
Putin may have more subtle motives. Leaders often do. He may be diverting his people's attention from his own failures in domestic policy, adopting the time-honored method of cooking up an international crisis. The Crimea may be Russia's Falkland Island diversion. Or seizure of the Crimea, though of little real importance to the average Russian, may be of great importance -- for one reason or another -- to certain members of the oligarchy on whom Putin depends, to some extent, for support.
Or maybe the answer lies, at least in part, in Putin's own psychological needs. A man of his high levels of testosterone -- judo practioner, hockey player, Formula-1 race driver, skier, Harley-Davidson owner, fisherman, eager homophobe -- needs an outlet for his manly aggression. His role is not to offer a hand to the downtrodden. He is a man of action! (We recall our own Teddy Roosevelt, although Teddy's zeal extended to national reform, as well!)
And what better action for a national leader than to lead an attack against his country's enemies, real or imaginary? English children are still taught to revere Henry V:
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers;
For he to-day that sheds his blood
with me
Shall be my brother;
Putin may see himself as Russia's Henry V, a king whose ringing phrases never touched on the daily lives of the average Englishman, the common folks who,"now a-bed, shall think themselves accursed they were not here."
Or as a Frenchman, Georges Clemenceau put the traditional "great leader" case less poetically:
My home policy: I wage war. My foreign policy: I wage war. All the time I wage war.
Secretary of State Kerry describes Putin's actions in the Crimea: “It’s really nineteenth century behavior in the twenty-first century.” He's right. Unfortunately, Putin doesn't care about being au courant. Or even "grown up," as the world now defines national leadership that is adult. He doesn't mind throwing a tantrum now and then.
Russia and its leaders will eventually reach the twenty-first century, but until they decide that domestic peace, prosperity and happiness are more desirable than the joys of grabbing real estate, the rest of the world needs to figure out how to avoid the threat Russia presents to international rules of conduct and how to minimize the dangers it presents to world peace.