Caution in the Middle East

Iran is developing nuclear weapons. That seems probable, according to a report provided to the Security Council by the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency. Some of Iran's secret work might be devoted to peaceful use of nuclear energy, according to the report, but other efforts "are specific to nuclear weapsons."

For the past several weeks, Israel has been warning of a possible bombing attack on Iran's nuclear development sites. Many observers believe that the recent assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists and the dissemination of a computer worm designed to interfere with operation of Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges have been the work of Israeli and/or American agents.

I am totally against nuclear weapons proliferation. I have been hoping, despite evidence to the contrary, that Iran was sincere in its assertions that its nuclear program was designed solely for the peaceful use of atomic energy. The U.N. report, a copy of which was leaked this week, makes my hope seem excessively optimistic.

Nevertheless, the idea of an Israeli attack on Iran is appalling. The United States, rightly or wrongly, would be perceived as complicit in such an attack. The statement this week by a spokesman for the Obama administration was not helpful:

"We, of course, never remove from the table any option in a situation like this, but we are very focused on diplomacy," said White House spokesman Jay Carney.

Instead, we should have made it clear that we would have no part in any unilateral attack on Iran or any other country. Such a statement would not preclude participation in additional international sanctions, if necessary.

We are correct in fearing proliferation of nuclear weapons. But Iran is also correct in sensing a certain arrogance on America's part, the United States possessing an enormous nuclear arsenal of its own. And Israel? Israel maintains an official stance of ambiguity as to whether it possess nuclear weapons ("nuclear opacity," they call it), but, along with India, Pakistan and North Korea, is generally believed to have developed nuclear weapons capability. (Israel, unlike Iran, has never signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.) Iran may sense a certain hypocrisy in our willingness to accept nuclear armament by nations perceived as friendly, while attacking less friendly nations for taking even preparatory steps in that direction.

Aside from the legalities of both nuclear proliferation by Iran and of a pre-emptive attack on a sovereign nation by Israel, exactly what is it about Iran's achievement of a nuclear capacity that we feel might justify such an attack? Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad tend to speak in tones of inflated inflammatory hyperbole, which is unfortunate for the success of Iran's foreign relations. But Iran's actual foreign policy has been cautious.

In 1980, lest we forget, Iran was deliberately and viciously attacked by Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces, hoping to defeat Iran during a moment of weakness following the 1978 Revolution. The war lasted for eight years, with a devastating loss of Iranian life. Monuments to the men and boys who died in that war can be seen everywhere in Iran today. Iran suffered an estimated one million casualties, with many survivors still suffering from Iraq's use of chemical warfare.

Iranians remember well the horrors of war. They are not apt to leap willingly into a new one. Their rhetoric may sound wild, but they are not stupid: they know that a nuclear attack on Israel would bring swift retribution from many sources.

More likely, they would use their nuclear capability to increase their own credibility in foreign affairs. After the Kuwait war with Iraq, when the United States essentially eliminated Iraq's defensive capability in one day, a spokesman for another Arab country -- I don't recall which -- commented that no country would ever challenge the United States again militarily, unless it had nuclear weapons. Iranians may have been listening -- concerned less about their ability to defy America militarily than in their own ability to be taken seriously as a major player in the Middle East.

We would find a nuclear armed Iran to be an inconvenience in our relations with Middle Eastern countries. But the prospect of future inconvenience doesn't justify an attack. We dealt with similar "inconveniences" in our relations with the Soviet Union; we face similar inconveniences today in dealing with Russia and China. We can handle the diplomatic challenges.

If we look over the history of American relations in the Middle East, one lesson we should learn is that nothing is constant. A friend today is an enemy tomorrow, and vice versa. We covertly supported Saddam Hussein's war against Iran, because of the hostility of the Iranian clergy after their Revolution. Ten years later, we were attacking Iraq.

If the friendship of any nation in the Middle East today would be valuable to the United States, it would be that of Iran. The Iranian people are sophisticated, with a strong sense of pride in their nation and in its lengthy history of civilization. The country, despite years of international sanctions, is modern with a good infrastructure. Iran still has a large middle class with close ties to America and to the West in general. Today, we may feel that Iran's political leaders are impossible to deal with. These feelings can change quickly with time.

But time would not fade the memory of an armed attack so quickly. Ask any Iranian, conservative or liberal, devout or secular, and he or she will tell you that an armed attack on Iran would be a disaster for both Iran and the West. Such an attack would unite all factions against the attackers. It would unite the country behind its present rulers. It would not be forgotten, not for generations.

Let's not go there.